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PARADOXES OF ECONOMIC THEORIES AND POLITICS1 
The article gives an overview of the evolution of economic theories, the conditions which led to the for-
mation of their modern schools and focuses on the analysis of arising classic, neoclassic and Keynesian doc-
trines encouraged by the growth and development of productive forces (factors of production), the formation 
of big corporations-monopolists and technological progress. The severe global recessions (1929–1933) and 
other shocks of the capitalist system brought to life the doctrinal theory, which is alternative to the classi-
cal one. The doctrinal theory was a theoretic and methodological basis of the System for half a century, then 
it was replaced by neoliberal and monetarist theories that proved to be inconsistent during the global cri-
sis and depression in 2008–2013. The article also touches upon the necessity to change the economic policy 
of Russia — an urgent problem resulting from a policy of the Western countries trying to suffocate the coun-
try with sanctions.
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Liberal Theories Are an Outstanding 
Achievement of the Civilization 
There is a well-known thought of J. M. Keynes, 
a great economist, that the vision of the economic 
policy of any statesman is based on a particular 
economic view, regardless of whether he/she is 
aware of that. However, regular citizens are de-
luded into thinking that the government is free 
from any theoretical schools. They do not look at 
the “philosophy of politics”, rather consider the 
living standards of people, first of all, their key 
indicators — economic growth, salary, benefits 
and pensions, rate of unemployment, confidence 
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about the future, etc. Are there many people who 
think about which theory (philosophy) has been 
the basis for the Russian economic (macroeco-
nomic) policy since Vladimir Putin came to power 
in August 1999 until now? The matter is that how-
ever much people curse the “turbulent 90s”, Russia 
follows consistently the same very course offered 
to it by the Washington Consensus in 1991 (the 
Russian Parliament for the time being, opposed it 
and for that reason it was abolished) with further 
consequences. Another issue: it is strange to hear 
(and read) numerous speeches and massive pub-
lications of national politicians and economists, 
not to mention journalists and others who declare 
that the liberalism is the origin of all the problems 
of Russia one may think of. At the same time, de-
spite some changes, although not very significant, 
the economic policy of the government, as I said 
above, rests upon clear neoliberal and monetar-
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ist concepts heavily criticized during and after the 
global recession of 2008–2010 [1]. However, these 
concepts can hardly be called liberal ones. They 
obviously contradict the classical economic liber-
alism that originated in the works of great Adam 
Smith and his followers — the fathers of the eco-
nomic theory. Liberal ideas of the Enlightenment 
had a potent effect upon the formation and devel-
opment of the economic doctrines that became 
the main components of classical economic the-
ory (and political economy) by Adam Smith; they 
were the ones that influenced the social revolu-
tions in Western Europe and North America (in 
North America, social (bourgeois) revolution had 
a form of anticolonial struggle against the Crown 
(British Empire)). The notion of “economic lib-
eralism” is a catchall term, comprising a range 
of pre-classical, classical, Keynesian and social-
ist concepts and doctrines starting from the end 
of the 17th century until now. It does not only 
substantiate the free enterprise and free trade 
(Laisse-faire, free trade) based on private property 
and free competition but also places the problem 
of the man of labor in the center and considers la-
bor as the main source of wealth. Adam Smith also 
introduced his famous “natural law of justice”. By 
developing different aspects of this law, Smith in-
tegrated it into the key doctrines of the “classical” 
theory. Smith’s successors (J. S. Mill, T. R. Malthus, 
especially David Ricardo), as well as Karl Marx (the 
founder of another system) elaborated the labor 
theory of value by Smith (Marx wrote about the 
capitalism 100 years later after Adam Smith, when 
it already acquired quite new features). But one 
main concern unites all the classics — care about 
the man of labor. They grounded a necessity of fair 
distribution of the newly created value in compli-
ance with the role each of the three factors played 
in the production (labor, capital, land). They re-
jected the all-might of the absolutist state in the 
late Middle Ages and in the early period of capi-
talism, suppressing the emerging capitalism and 
the bourgeoisie — the progressive class, progress 
beams, whose ideology was the liberalism that 
played a huge positive role in the development of 
the modern civilization. By a strange coincidence, 
the principal work by Smith called An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
was published in 1776, the same year when the 
United States Declaration of Independence was 
adopted. The economic liberalism, just as the po-
litical liberalism, was a product of a long evolution 
of the Enlightenment and its consequence — the 
modernism. That is why not only limited educated 
strata of the society and the new commercial and 
industrial bourgeoisie but most of the urban pop-
ulation — labor strata (emerging proletariat, craft 
and workshop communities as well as prosperous 
farmers who supply their products to the town and 
suffer from strong pressure of feudal lords) em-
braced it in the 18th century. The central idea of 
the liberalism (both economic and political lib-
eralism) was not only the equality before the law, 
but also the equality of opportunities, the creation 
of conditions for their implementation, the socie-
ty’s care for the weak and the vulnerable, children, 
ill people. As the capitalism was developing and 
the liberal values were disseminating, the vision 
of Smith’s capitalism and its original classic inter-
pretations were subject to the strongest erosion. 
The corporations — monopolies and banks — were 
becoming more and more powerful; they were not 
afraid of the state anymore, and influenced di-
rectly the formation of a particular government 
through the political parties or trade unions they 
controlled. The economic doctrines were los-
ing their independence more and more, they sur-
vived only at a microlevel, in the areas related to 
the market forces and corporate competitiveness. 
It should be noted that the entire second half of 
the 19th century was the most serious test for the 
capitalism, in Western Europe the social revolu-
tions followed one another, the wars were raging, 
Marxist theories were rapidly spreading encour-
aged by the extremely tight situation of the labor 
class, which number was growing fast as a result of 
the capitalism development. The living conditions 
were harsh, children’s labor was widespread. The 
warnings of Adam Smith, a founder of the classi-
cal economic theory, with regard to the fair distri-
bution of surplus product between all the owners 
of the factors of production, sank into obscurity — 
the only postulate remained from his theory: “ab-
solute freedom of private enterprise”. Perhaps, be-
ing influenced by a hazard of onrushing Marxism 
(that radically rejects private property), Otto von 
Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor of Prussia (who 
united the isolated German principalities into one 
state), was the first to feel the deadly threat. He in-
troduced serious limitations to uncontrollable ex-
ploitation of workers through the labor laws, es-
tablished eight-hour day, days-off, medical care 
for workers, universal education and other social 
standards. It improved significantly the economic 
and social situation in the capitalist countries 
where trade unions also started to operate. As an 
alternative to Marxist doctrine about the armed 
uprising of the laboring class, a reformist way of 
social protests appeared — the result of mitigation 
of the extremely rough model of the post-Smith 
capitalism (during its transition to monopolism). 
But the American capitalism in the second half of 
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the 19th century had ferocious manifestations; the 
regime fiercely punished the dissatisfied workers 
who went to the protest demonstrations against 
inhuman labor conditions. By the way, here, in the 
US, May 1 was first declared the day of workers, 
having become an international Labor Day. 
The End of Smith’s Classical Capitalism
As it was mentioned above, the end of the 19th 
century was characterized by fast growing cor-
porations and monopolist banks, the domination 
of giant economic and financial institutes which 
branch networks stretch to all the continents. The 
USA, Great Britain, Germany and partially the 
Russian Empire stood out, which economic in-
terests (to be more precise, the interests of the 
leading entrepreneurs-monopolists) required the 
world repartition. Currently, in 2014, when many 
countries, especially in Europe, commemorate the 
100-year anniversary of the First World War, the 
paramount attention in the speeches and publi-
cations is paid to subjective acts of the governors 
of main European countries, while the giant in-
dustrial and financial monopolies, among which 
German ones were especially aggressive, were the 
real triggers of the First World War. The war led to 
terrific consequences for the countries — key par-
ticipants — four empires disappeared, the USSR 
appeared; the disasters of the peoples were awful, 
misery and hand-to-mouth existence, once seen 
in most nations, now were present in the richest 
countries, including the USA, up to the late 1940s 
and the early 1950s (when the welfare state ap-
peared). It is not a common practice to write about 
this in the scientific articles, perhaps, because 
of an illusion that “people in the Western coun-
tries have always lived well and happily”. However, 
some distinguished scientists of the West, includ-
ing the USA, feel free to discuss this delicate is-
sue [2]. This war, fatal for the absolute majority of 
the peoples in Europe (and not only), appeared to 
be good for big banks and corporations: they were 
growing at a record speed and “shared” their in-
come with workers less and less. As a result, in the 
1920s, the class struggle in Europe and the  USA 
grew much sharper, mass strikes, demonstrations 
and other protest actions became usual. They were 
suppressed cruelly by policemen and army troops. 
Unprecedented despotism of big corporations and 
banks became a special phenomenon, first of all, 
in the USA, where stock market was then booming, 
speculative exchange transactions increased rap-
idly. Moreover, there was no central financial reg-
ulator — the central bank. Two attempts to create 
it in the 19th century failed — private banks con-
sidered it to be the violation of the Constitution 
and succeeded in its liquidation (both of the First 
and Second Central Banks) by the Supreme Court. 
Smith’s capitalism with a doctrine of relatively 
equal distribution of material benefits was already 
a history, although, the theoreticians, who re-
flected the interests of big corporations to a large 
extent, glorified the name of Adam Smith and the 
university professors were constantly “discover-
ing” new ideas by Adam Smith that idealized the 
modern economic situation. A huge number of 
“parallel theories and concepts” appeared that 
glorified two doctrines of Smith, namely: absolute 
freedom for private enterprise and no government 
interference into the economy. All the other pos-




It is not a coincidence that in 1929 the fa-
mous stock market collapse happened, the Great 
Depression began, spreading worldwide, having 
almost extinguished the world capitalism. A lot of 
scientific and other articles were written about the 
reasons of this crisis, which was unique in scale 
and depth. There were attempts to make an anal-
ysis through a combination of different acciden-
tal circumstances, some analysts saw the reasons 
in immoderate greed of the stock dealers involved 
into speculative trading, others (already at that 
time) were trying to see the origin of the crisis in 
the “interference” of the federal government into 
the financial sector (although these attempts were 
extremely timid). And, at last, one more point 
of view, new for that time, which appeared both 
in European and American printed mass media, 
challenged the system itself, although not very 
clearly. F. D. Roosevelt’s presidency in the midst 
of the crisis (1933) and his decisive measures 
laid the foundation for reconsidering traditional 
roles of the state and the enterprise. There were 
real grounds for the emergence of an alternative 
economic theory — Keynesianism — as a meth-
odological basis for a new economic policy of the 
world capitalism. It became clear that Smith’s eco-
nomic theory, especially in its absolutely vulgar-
ized form with humanistic aspects removed, does 
not work anymore. “Free enterprise stayed in the 
age of Queen Victoria”, Professor Paul Samuelson, 
an American economist, aptly said. The problem 
was that the formation of the monopolistic econ-
omy sector changed the fundamentals of the clas-
sical (Smith’s) capitalism — financial capital ap-
peared. The monopolistic sector — financial capi-
tal — lived its life and was indifferent to the com-
petition, and the antitrust law and practice do not 
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influence it much. In some sense, it started to re-
mind the socialist public sector, although in terms 
of contribution into GDP its share did not ex-
ceed 25 % just before the Great Depression (now 
— around 40 %). However due to the huge power 
of individual corporations and influence upon the 
politics, they had (and still have) a dramatic im-
pact upon the reproduction and the national pol-
icy. And since they were the key speculators, the 
crash of the New York Stock Exchange triggered 
the Great Depression. 
New Deal of President Roosevelt  
and the Welfare State
Yet in 1933, during the continuing deadening 
economic crisis, F. D. Roosevelt, a new American 
President, came into the White House and started 
rapidly to introduce a well prepared program 
called the New Deal that meant. unprecedented 
state regulation of all the aspects of economic, fi-
nancial, agricultural areas, and the labor relations. 
Big entrepreneurs and bankers were trying to re-
sist, but their resistance was fast and intensively 
suppressed by the White House, moreover, they 
were frustrated by the accusations of the society 
that the “fat cats” were true culprits of the crisis. 
Many of them went bankrupt, others lost a signifi-
cant part of their wealth. The tax for the rich class 
was increased unprecedentedly high — up to 90 %. 
Fundamentally new laws were formed and enacted, 
governing almost all the aspects of economic and 
financial activity of private agents of production 
and market. In 1936, three years after the begin-
ning of Roosevelt’s reforms, a British economist 
J.M. Keynes wrote his renowned work The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
which immediately became famous like the work 
by Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), 160 years 
later. Over more than one and a half century, the 
capitalism became fundamentally different, the 
laws discovered by Smith were not relevant any-
more, and a new model of politics, which would be 
able to ensure its functioning as a capitalist sys-
tem, was required. Keynes, an outstanding econo-
mist of the 20th century, managed to do that. He 
studied not only the practice of the military regu-
lation by the governments during the First World 
War, the USSR planning economy, but also the 
practice of the New Deal by Roosevelt. He came 
to an uncompromising conclusion: the modern 
capitalism can evolve as a global system through 
intensive regulation of main aspects of the eco-
nomic and social life only, while Adam Smith, wit-
nessing the emerging “young” capitalism, believed 
that the capitalism can develop successfully if the 
state (the Crown) did not interfere into the activ-
ity of entrepreneurs, restricted only to the func-
tions of defense, law enforcement and establish-
ment of common rules for business by free manu-
facturers. The age of the Keynesian revolution be-
gan that most successfully advanced during the 
second half a the 20th century. These years, the 
capitalism (taking into account the competition 
between two global social systems; the socialism 
was then extremely attractive for hundreds of mil-
lions people all over the world) allowed a signifi-
cant improvement of life standards in all the de-
veloped capitalist countries (thirty countries); the 
consumer society was formed, the welfare state 
appeared (according to J. Galbraith), a potential of 




One of the main reasons of the Keynesianism 
defeat is that West European corporations forti-
fied their position in the 1950–1970s and entered 
into the competition with American ones as equal, 
particularly in West European economic environ-
ment (initially). They already did not need care by 
the state (in compliance with the Keynesian pol-
icy) but felt it as a burden and demanded from 
their governments to cancel many rules and 
standards governing big business — like it was 
made to a large extent in the USA. In its turn, the 
Keynesian proponents associated successful at-
tack of the European and Japanese corporations 
upon the positions of American big business with 
active governmental interference into the econ-
omy and especially the finance sector, and persis-
tently demanded the liquidation of many institu-
tions created by Roosevelt’s New Deal, and the rel-
evant laws. Hence, slogans about return of the free 
enterprise were quite popular both in the USA and 
West Europe. 
The second reason, undoubtedly, was that the 
frequently alternating governments in Western 
Europe messed around nationalizations and dena-
tionalizations. Nevertheless, the public sector in 
all industries of the leading countries of the con-
tinent (Great Britain, France, and Italy) was obvi-
ously unreasonably vast which resulted in lower 
efficiency and productivity, since the competi-
tion was getting narrower. The academic commu-
nity understood this circumstance and concerned 
much about the unfavorable situation (especially 
in England from the second half of 1970s).
The third reason, in my opinion, was that, be-
ing in absolute domination for half a century, the 
Keynesianism was developing poorly, was not en-
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riched with outstanding ideas and was turning into 
dogmatism more and more, although in the 1940–
1950s some theoreticians (R. Harrod, E. Domar, 
P. Samuelson and other Keynesians and academic 
economists) someway contributed to its develop-
ment (Neo-Keynesians). The Keynesianism inade-
quately addressed the issues of microeconomics, 
whilst the classical and neoclassical schools had 
always been strong in it, and macroeconomic de-
velopments were becoming more and more dog-
matic. At the same time, the works of philoso-
pher K. Popper, economists L. Mises and F. Hayek 
(American-Austrian school) were becoming more 
and more popular. These works heavily criticized 
the Keynesianism. The authors drew a parallel be-
tween the Keynesianism and the “ineffective so-
cialism”. Although their views ascended to Adam 
Smith, they were absolutely tough with regard 
to social politics and the role of working people, 
the distribution of surplus product and the role of 
working people in management. They were hos-
tile to trade unions. These and other analysts used 
their talent to aggrandize private property, to re-
move all the existing obstacles for entrepreneur-
ship, to exclude the government from the econ-
omy sector. F. Hayek even justified the necessity 
of money issue through private banks, “taking” 
this function from the central banks of the states. 
Samuelson wrote with regard to this trend: “While 
moving from the right flank to the left one, a new 
economy (Keynesian, mixed economy) was again 
attacked by the representatives of its profession, 
by economists-libertarians, the apostles of free 
competition. Such names as Frank Knight, Henry 
Simons, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman are 
associated with this main school”. That is how the 
modern neoliberalism was formed as an extremely 
reactionary-conservative political and eco-
nomic school of thought. These ideas were used 
by Chicago school headed by Professor Milton 
Friedman which was growing strong. He was en-
gaged in the fundamental research of the role of 
money (hencefrom the term “money” or “mone-
tary” economics comes), criticized the Keynesians 
for alleged disregard of the role of money in stud-
ying the dynamics of common economic processes 
and money influence upon them. But since there 
wasn’t any own scientific background for the mon-
etary economics, Friedman based it on the gen-
eral theory of neoliberalism, on the well-known 
quantity theory of money, and on the Rational 
Expectations Theory (RET). The combination of 
these components formed the basis for the mon-
etary economics. Having absorbed the doctrines 
of neoliberalists-conservators, the monetary eco-
nomics became the same very neoliberal mone-
tary economics that superseded the Keynesianism. 
According to its provisions, the influence upon the 
economy meant the manipulation of the interest 
rate of the Central Bank and money quantity with 
minimal taxes imposed on private enterprises 
(i.e., the concentration on the budget regulation 
only). The influence upon the investment activity 
to reduce unemployment and increase business 
activity, traditional for the Keynesianism, was de-
clared unnecessary, since the freedom of private 
agents of market is a better mechanism to find a 
balance. The pure budget regulation prevailed in 
prejudice of the lending activity and tax regula-
tion (with increased taxes for the rich people and 
big corporations). Thus, the opportunities to in-
fluence the cycle shrank to a great extent (by the 
way, in 2003 Professor Robert Lucas declared the 
cycle a non-topical problem). As a result, some 
sort of a theory appeared (although it reminded 
more an accounting approach). As it was men-
tioned above, a neoliberal monetary school in the 
modern economic thought appeared, called liber-
tarism by Samuelson absolutely reasonably [3, p. 
401]. This trend had a slight relation to the clas-
sical theory, but nevertheless, they started to call 
it neoclassical school. Undoubtedly, it was a step 
back from the level achieved by the world’s eco-
nomic thought. In my opinion, a simplified ap-
proach, easy accessibility of the policy instru-
ments, unsophisticated formulas used for devel-
opment of the macroeconomic policy encouraged 
the dissemination of this trend among govern-
mental authorities. By the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, the neoliberal monetarism was fully intro-
duced as the ideological and theoretical (intellec-
tual) basis for economic policy of most developed 
countries, although to a different extent in each of 
them. The abolition of the Keynesian institutions 
and regulation mechanisms started, the public 
sector of economy was liquidated, the direct meth-
ods of the governmental influence upon the econ-
omy were declared to be almost evil personified, 
thousands of publications appeared saying about 
some “self-regulating organizations” (a shell no-
tion) etc. The new laws of the USA (for exam-
ple, Law On Deregulation of the Financial Sector 
adopted in January 1980 when Ronald Reagan 
was the President) opened the door for an explo-
sive growth of derivatives, especially hedge funds, 
which played a fatal role in the global recession of 
2008. A decade after, this theory was put into the 
basis of the Washington Consensus, developed by 
a group of professors from the US universities un-
der the guidance of John Williamson, the Director 
of Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
The Washington Consensus was ordered by the 
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Ministry of Finance of the USA and IMF [4] and 
was integrated into the adjustment programs of 
the international financial institutions and waw 
later adopted as the reference reform program 
by all states that received aid from the IMF. This 
very program was fully implemented in Russia in 
the 1990s and, seemingly, has still been imple-
mented. For this purpose, one should compare the 
Washington Consensus, Friedman’s monetarism 
and Mises’ and Hayek’s vision about capitalism 
as the peak of civilization with that real economic 
policy pursued in Russia and with the statements 




Inner propensity towards conflict, diversity of 
trends and longing to domination of individual 
theories and concepts has always been inherent to 
the economic science. The abundance of concepts, 
different methods and approaches to the analysis 
of economic processes are a permanent phenom-
enon since the time when this science emerged. 
They are especially typical in the periods of weak 
and exhausted official doctrines that form a basis 
of the economic policy of the state. In this case, 
another theory usually replaces it provided that 
it has a well-developed theoretic and the practi-
cal basis. However it does not happen, if the al-
ternative theory does not reflect the interests of 
the governing class in full. This is typical for the 
out-dated neoliberal monetary school which inad-
equacy particularly manifested during the recent 
global crisis (2008–2009) and the Great Recession 
(2011–2013), but political and business commu-
nities of the leading countries across the world 
hold on it desperately. It is interesting that with 
a huge variety of theoretical concepts, doctrines, 
etc. available, only few of them were/are self-con-
tained systems which were/are used in practical 
politics of different states: 
1. Classical economic theory by Adam Smith;
2. The Keynesianism and Neo-Keynesianism;
3. Neoclassical theory in a form of the neolib-
eral monetarism;
4. Marxism of Soviet-socialist kind;
5. State social capitalism as specific theory and 
practice of the People’s Republic of China.
State capitalism originally launched in the 
USSR as the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1921–
1927) is now deepened and enriched in the 
People’s Republic of China. 
The abovementioned schools have never been 
isolated one from another. The first classical the-
ory absorbed many economic concepts of early 
ages (those of physiocrats and mercantilists), and 
later ones were glad to borrow the doctrines and 
approaches of others, provided that they did not 
contradict their principal postulates. The neolib-
eral monetarism is notable for the special “pan-
tophagy”, it is ready to borrow any ideas from 
other schools if they do not aggress private prop-
erty, free enterprise and do not require active gov-
ernmental interference into the economy sector. 
With this regard, a lot of important questions 
arise. Are the laws of young growing and progres-
sive capitalism, once discovered by Adam Smith, 
that oppose feudal and monarchial states with 
their privileges for the nobility, still of impor-
tance? Or, perhaps, they were not laws at all? This 
question was raised by J. M. Keynes. Or, perhaps, 
they changed, transformed into something new 
with other manifestations, lost their meaning and 
were replaced by other ones? If such other rules 
did appeared, what kind of rules are they? What 
do we, professors, have to tell our students about 
that? Is private ownership of the production fac-
tors “sacred and indefeasible”? This matter both-
ered ancient writers and philosophers (Plato was 
against private property, while Aristotle — in fa-
vour). Nowadays, this matter became topical due 
to more apparent weakness and inefficiency of 
the largest corporations and banks across the 
world. For example, what are the consequences of 
the socialization of production forces (factors of 
production)? Did the technological advance and, 
particularly, information and technological revo-
lutions, which are like incoming waves, together 
with the internationalization and globalization, 
change the basic features of the capitalist sys-
tem? If they did, which forms are they manifested 
in? Because a phenomenon always manifests it-
self, although not always expressly, meaning that 
it is not always obvious and evident. These mat-
ters require further elaboration. The economic 
system of capitalism was constantly losing its 
natural power of self-regulation through reduc-
tion of the competitive grounds from the mo-
ment of its establishment and development on 
the newest technological grounds, which inevita-
bly led to enlargement of the market agents and, 
ultimately, to the monopolization and appear-
ance of giant corporations. As a matter of fact, the 
competition between large monopolist corpora-
tions and banks disappeared, it remained only in 
small and medium business — Adam Smith and 
later classics discovered the laws of this (non-mo-
nopolized) economy. The biggest sector of the 
bank and corporation economy of the states is 
outside the competitive relations, the same as 
the whole segment of large international entre-
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preneurship. This is already secured politically 
by the decisions of international organizations 
— the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Basel 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) declared 
that backbone organizations (banks and corpo-
rations) are too large and public to let them go 
bankrupt (these are so called backbone and global 
backbone organizations Siffli and G-Siffli). As a 
result, two sectors operate in the economy of the 
leading countries and in the global economy, and 
this dichotomy is insuperable, it aggravates inter-
nal conflicts of the capitalism as the global sys-
tem. High profitability of giant monopolies is not 
associated with their efficiency (the efficiency is 
weak) but with the effect of scale, overexploita-
tion of the labor and redistribution into their fa-
vour of a portion of profit meant for medium and 
small business that is dominated by the monopo-
lized sector, although the latter contributes only 
about 30–35 % of GDP even in the most devel-
oped and richest countries. In view of the above 
mentioned alone, the inviolability of the vision 
of the modern economic system represented in 
classical and neoclassical works is a dogmatism, 
which is quite close to that vision of socialism 
that existed in the USSR. The unwillingness of 
the politicians to see that real dogmatism, rather 
than implicit contradictions inherent to the so-
cialism, resulted in the collapse of the USSR, as 
some analysts state. The same ignominious end 
threatens the modern capitalism if its leaders and 
scientific economic school of thought treat the 
dogmas of theory and politics a la-Soviet hop-
ing for some internal impulses of development, 
which faded away when powerful financial capi-
tal came on the stage in all its ugly majesty, hav-
ing crashed the driver of Smith’s economy — com-
petition. Another evidence is the sanction policy 
of the leading economies, aiming directly and in-
directly at the deformation of international divi-
sion of labor and violating the interaction of pro-
duction factors in many countries. Great Adam 
Smith, this high priest of the bourgeoisie, op-
posed these actions of the royal power. Modern 
libertarists, supposedly great admirers of his, on 
the contrary, oppose natural economic relations 
dictated by the interests of businessmen. This is 
confirmed by a sad fact: if politics starts dominat-
ing over the economy, it always has the bad end. 
The economic theory as one of the main 
branches of the social science has never been free 
from the state policy, fight of the social strata and 
conflicts in the governing elites. As I wrote be-
fore, the second half of the 19th century was un-
der strong influence of the Marxism and par-
tially saw its triumph over other schools of eco-
nomic thought. Tight competition and fight deter-
mined a high rise of the economic thought. The 
appearance of numerous schools of economic the-
ory with bright intellectual leaders strongly influ-
enced not only the history of economic thought, 
but, first of all, the formation of different aspects 
of the capitalist system itself and the economic 
policy of the state. However, the schools of eco-
nomic thought had notably specific political and 
ideological views after the split of the world into 
two opposite world systems after 1917. During 
75 years of the world socialism under the aegis 
of the USSR covering huge territories of all con-
tinents, innumerable ideas were born in political 
centers of this system that substantiate its eter-
nity and inviolability, its superiority over the cap-
italist system. Simultaneously, in the centers of 
the world capitalism even more theories were 
born proving (and being not less convincing) the 
superiority of the capitalism and its brilliant fu-
ture. Furthermore, these two systems were con-
verging inexorably (although slowly and contra-
dictorily) that was denied by the representatives 
of official science on both sides. It is not a coin-
cidence that the work The Stages of Economic 
Growth (1961) by Professor Walt Rostow, an out-
standing representative of convergence theoreti-
cians, was acknowledged neither in the Western 
countries nor in the USSR. The explosion of inter-
est to this book in the West was not long, and in 
the academic communities of the USSR it was un-
mercifully criticized for almost twenty years, al-
though it was not published and there were very 
few people who read it. The fight and opposi-
tion in the economic thought were principal; in-
numerable philosophical, political and economic, 
sociologic, ethical and ideological and concep-
tual framework was developing. Certainly, it was 
a positive environment that was to encourage 
the development of both global systems, includ-
ing towards their rapprochement — convergence 
worked regardless the will and awareness of pol-
iticians. Yet one system collapsed, which inevita-
bly weakened the other one (since the global com-
petition disappeared). As odd as it may seem, the 
fall of the world socialism synchronized with the 
beginning of the crisis of the international mone-
tarism and neoliberalism, led to its new reinforce-
ment. The Russian government (represented by 
the President and the Government despite the re-
sistance of the Parliament) was glad to adopt the 
economic policy embodied as the famous postu-
lates of the Washington Consensus. And despite 
this policy nearly brought the Russian Federation 
to break down in the 1990s, these postulates are 
still the basis for the governmental policy.
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A great number of academic and non-academic 
articles both in Russia and abroad study the rea-
sons for the global recession (2008–2010), includ-
ing international reports and reports of the UN or-
ganizations, the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank for 
International Settlements etc. My works (mon-
ographs, textbooks, research articles in journals, 
on the Internet, lectures in the European univer-
sities, and interviews in mass media within 2008–
2014) also deal with this problem extensively. 
Hence, let’s recall only some bad consequences of 
this smashing recession, which in terms of scale 
and depth is comparable with the classic Great 
Depression (1929–1933). According to the UN, in 
2008–2010, the global unemployment rate rose by 
50 million people, the standards of living in gen-
eral deteriorated even in the richest countries in 
the world (it are still deteriorating). A huge num-
ber of companies and banks worldwide went bank-
rupt, including very large ones (General Motors, 
Chrysler, Ford, Lehman Brothers, the largest 
mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac 
— the total assets of these two giants were USD 
5 trillion); American International Group (AIG), 
the largest investment-insurance company with 
assets of USD 1.4 trillion, operating in more than 
60 countries, ceased to exist. Two famous banks 
— Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs — were on 
the verge of bankruptcy, the same as a number of 
other banks in the USA, Europe, Japan and other 
countries. In 2008–2009 in the US only, about 200 
large financial organizations, including all invest-
ment banks, went out of business. Confusion and 
disconfidence reigned in the political and busi-
ness circles. Many analysts (let alone regular citi-
zens) witnessed with gloating delight how power-
ful managers of the corporations and banks, who 
yesterday spoke scornfully against “state inter-
ference with the business”, were queuing humbly 
for “pecuniary aid” from the USA treasury. “All-
mighty market works no longer!” “One should do 
something to the capitalism!”, these panic state-
ments of Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of France, 
illustrate well the situation. “Hedge funds (the 
USA) must be liquidated!”, Angela Merkel, the 
Chancellor of Germany, said then; “Off-shore 
business of the European countries is also guilty 
of the collapse”, G. Bush, the US President, said in 
his turn. These were some statements of the prin-
cipal leaders who blamed each other for what had 
happened, including at the G-20 London Summit 
devoted to the development of measures to stop 
further growth of the recession.
The hard choice for President Bush. G. Bush 
Junior is usually associated with an image of a dash-
ing cowboy from Texas, a politician, not very intel-
lectually competent, apt to adventurous actions 
(war in Iraq) etc. However, his reaction to the cri-
sis in the US (from the second half of 2007) was ex-
tremely vigorous and more than appropriate. Being 
completely confident that absolute freedom of en-
terprise is good, George Bush, the conservative lib-
ertarian, an opponent of the state interference, 
would never agree to strengthen governmental in-
terference in economic activities, they believed that 
it was a kind of taboo for him. And, correspondingly, 
these beliefs could restrict his anti-crisis measures a 
lot. Nevertheless, in the very beginning of the crisis, 
Bush and his Cabinet simply rejected the “values” of 
libertarians and monetarists and chose a way of in-
tensive governmental interference, laying the foun-
dation for return of the Keynesianism into politics. 
Beside a huge pecuniary aid to the large business, 
the aid was provided to small enterprises as well, and 
what is the most important — it was the first time 
since Roosevelt’s New Deal when the government 
decided to nationalize distressed banks and indus-
trial corporations by establishing the governmental 
financial control over them. That in fact caused acrid 
articles in certain print media in Russia that started 
to speak about a “new socialism in the citadel of the 
capitalism — the US.” Similar actions were taken 
in Europe and other countries around the world. 
Totally, according to different sources, about USD 20 
trillion were forwarded to rescue the world’s capital-
ist system in 2008–2010. The second determining 
factor that allowed terminating the recession by the 
end of 2009 and beginning of 2010 and reaching the 
dynamics of world economy growth is an agreement 
of the countries for non-admission of protectionist 
measures. Let me remind that the Great Depression 
of 1929–1933 was unprecedented in scale and depth 
because all the countries followed a strict trading 
protectionism and it completely disorganized the in-
ternational trade. The third positive factor is the be-
ginning of resolute reorganization of the whole sys-
tem of international finances in 2008–2010 (frankly 
speaking, this reorganization failed later). This mat-
ter should be considered in more detail.
Institutional Changes in the World Financial 
System with Regard to the Global Recession
As the real scale and depth of the financial and 
economic recession of 2008 was realized, so called 
“backbone states” 1 cooperated to draft common 
1 The backbone states include those that contribute the biggest 
share of the world GDP, foreign trade and population. In terms 
of the level of development of the production factors, the back-
bone states are divided into the developed markets and emerg-
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and synchronized measures of global financial 
control. The G-8 and the G-20 played a considera-
ble role in providing political support, assuring the 
elaboration and introduction of new mechanisms 
into the global financial control system. Moreover, 
decision-taking and adoption of key financial and 
economic recommendations passed from the G-8 
into the G-20 which evidenced that the leading 
economics cannot already influence significantly 
without involvement of other emerging countries. 
The G-20 was created in 1999 to expand the dis-
cussion of key matters in economic and finan-
cial policy between the developed countries and 
the emerging countries. In the conditions of the 
global recession, the G-20 proved most suitable for 
the negotiation of common measures to overcome 
the crisis and for international coordination of ac-
tivities of individual states. The first G-20 summit 
was held in Washington on November 15, 2008. 
As a result, the Declaration and the Washington 
Action Plan were adopted. The Action Plan stipu-
lated the formulation and implementation for new 
initiatives in the area of international finances. In 
compliance with the G-20 recommendations and 
approval by the national governments, the follow-
ing decisions were taken:
1. The Research Group (RG) as part of the G-20 
was created that is to study the reasons of the re-
cessions and failures of the global lending market, 
to work out the steps to prevent similar crises and 
to submit such steps for consideration at the G-20 
summit.
2. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) that op-
erated under the G8 was enlarged and transformed 
into a body of the G-20 — the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB). It is responsible for drafting, together 
with the IMF, the proposals to influence the world 
financial markets.
3. Initially the Recommendations were issued 
as strategic reports of the FSF, and after its trans-
formation — as Reports of the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) for the G-20. They were reflected, par-
ticularly, in the agreements of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and chiefs of the central banks with 
regard to assuring better transparence of financial 
risks, enhancing the banks’ responsibility, includ-
ing markets. Currently, the term “emerging markets” is used to 
characterize the countries with dynamically growing economy. 
Group-20 includes Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Great Britain, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Canada, China, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, the USA, Turkey, France. Republic of South Africa, 
South Korea, Japan as well as the European Union, the IMF and 
the World Bank — as the institutional members. Around 90 % of 
the world GDP and 80 % of the international trade as well as two 
thirds of the global population fall onto G-20 share.
ing in financial reports, on the basis of uniform 
standards of financial instruments assessment. 
4. The IMF and the FSB were instructed to de-
velop the regulating measures and recommenda-
tions to overcome cyclicality of the world econ-
omy. (It was a rejection of a monetarist doctrine 
that denies the concept of “cycle” itself). They 
provided these recommendations, including the 
ones involving the increase of the representative 
share of the developing countries in the Boards of 
Directors of the IMF and the World Bank. 
5. The regulating agents were instructed to 
control the international rating agencies more 
efficiently.
6. The regulating bodies were offered to im-
prove the recommendations to increase the ef-
ficiency of risk management in the banks, to re-
consider the internal risk management and 
“Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management 
and Supervision” (Basel III). 
7. The national and regional regulating bodies 
were also offered to enhance the cooperation on 
the improvement of the mechanisms of regulation 
between jurisdictions at the international level. 
8. The supervision bodies were to closely co-
operate in the creation of supervision boards for 
all large international financial institutions. These 
supervision boards were created in 2009–2010 in 
most of backbone financial banking institutions. 
9. The regulating bodies were to take all the 
necessary measures to strengthen international 
mechanisms of crisis management. At the inter-
national level, one of the outlined measures was 
to extend the FSB to assure a wider participa-
tion of the emerging countries. That is why the 
FSF was extended and transformed into the FSB 
and new countries of the G-20 were included in 
it: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Spain, Saudi Arabia, 
Republic of South Africa and Turkey as well as the 
European Commission (EC).
10. The IMF and the FSB prepared an early pre-
vention mechanism; its first “launch” was made at 
the 2009 spring session of the IMF/ the WB. The 
IMF was obliged to play the main role in learning 
lessons from the global crisis 1 in a tight coopera-
tion and coordination with the FSB. 
11. Four working groups were created for the 
implementation of particular measures contained 
in the Washington Action Plan: 1. The Working 
1 In order to get this done, the whole composition of the IMF 
analytical subdivisions had to be changed, since during previ-
ous years they were influenced strongly by the economic liber-
tarianism, absolutely strange to those new instructions devel-
oped by the G-20 and other international organizations, includ-
ing the UN.
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Group (WG-1) The Increase of the Regulation 
Quality and Transparency at the Financial 
Markets; 2. The Working Group (WG-2) Extension 
of International Cooperation and Assurance of the 
Financial Markets Integrity; 3. The Working Group 
(WG-3) The IMF Reforming; 4. The Working Group 
(WG-4) The World Bank and Other Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDB).
All these developments and recommenda-
tions were submitted for consideration by the 
leaders of the states and governments during the 
G-20 Summit in London on April 02, 2009, where 
they were generally approved. During the London 
Summit, the Leaders’ Declaration was adopted. 
Besides, three additional documents were adopted: 
the Declaration on Consolidation of the World 
Financial System, the Declaration on Provision 
of Resources through International Financial 
Institutions and the Report on Implementation 
Results of the Washington Action Plan. During 
this Summit, the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) was finally transformed into the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB). Its functions were signifi-
cantly increased, particularly, its tasks included 
the identification of weaknesses in the world fi-
nancial system, the assurance of the coordination 
and information exchange between the authori-
ties, the monitoring over the activity of the insti-
tutions responsible for the development of stand-
ards, the cooperation with the Supervision Boards. 
The Board also plays an important role in imple-
menting the early prevention procedures to de-
tect macroeconomic and financial risks. The com-
mitments to strengthen the control over hedge-
funds and regulation of the financial derivative 
instruments were accepted in the Declaration 
on Consolidation of the World Financial System 
and other documents of the G-20. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was in-
structed to reconsider the minimum capital of the 
backbone banks and to produce the relevant rec-
ommendations to strengthen the compliance con-
trol (all these transformations were called Basel 
III).
As a result, the system of international fi-
nances that had been evolving for 30  years was 
fundamentally reformed, a lot of new regulation 
and supervision institutions appeared, the stat-
utes of traditional banks and other financial in-
stitutions were changed. Simultaneously, in many 
countries, including the USA, new laws were 
adopted (for example, the Dodd Frank Act in the 
USA) limiting the speculative trading and estab-
lishing tougher state control. Besides, certain ac-
tions were taken to disclose the banking “secrets” 
of a group of countries (Switzerland, Cyprus, 
Liechtenstein, etc.). Although they concerned lit-
tle the Caribbean and Asian countries where, evi-
dently, tremendous amounts of illegal money were 
concentrated. Broad statements concerning “a ne-
cessity of deep reforms of the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions” ended with a small enlargement of the 
IMF and the World Bank Boards of Directors for 
the account of the representatives of big emerging 
and developing countries. The policies of these or-
ganizations were not revised, although most ana-




The Return of Libertarism. Since the end of 
2009 and the beginning of 2010, the situation 
in the global economy, particularly in the devel-
oped countries, has started to change in a posi-
tive direction. That was caused not only by vast 
anti-crisis measures specified above, but also by 
a favorable situation in big emerging countries 
(China, India, Brazil, member-countries of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, some 
African and Arabic countries) that remained dur-
ing the crisis. In general, they supported the group 
of the developed countries through active trad-
ing and investments as well as purchase of se-
curities and bonds In this situation, the USA and 
the EU leaders decided to scale down many in-
centive measures, introduced within 2008–2009. 
They were called retroactively “provisional meas-
ures” (a necessity to reduce public expenditures, 
cancel easier access to lending resources, benefits 
for small enterprises, the regulation of the capi-
tal flow, taxes, employment support — these are 
measures of the Keynesian policy). The IMF was 
particularly aggressive in the restitution of mone-
tarism, insisting on introduction of “austerity pol-
icy” (belt-tightening policy) in the EU countries. 
Berlin supported intensively this policy, suppos-
ing that Germany spends “too much of its own 
money for the stabilization of Europe” and it is 
for the “other” countries to save governmental ex-
penditures. As a result, a quite dynamic restora-
tion process, typical for 2010, was interrupted by 
late 2010 and especially in 2011. In fact, the capi-
tal inflow from the banking system into the econ-
omy was terminated. After all, the UN experts (re-
ports of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development for the end of 2010 and June 
2011) warned about undesirability of regulating 
measures cancellation and as minimum — about 
their prematureness, since the growth was irreg-
ular and unsteady, the banks and companies did 
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not come into force, they did not gain confidence 
and treated new investments composedly. In ad-
dition, the revival of business activity did not take 
place in a number of the Mediterranean countries 
of Eurozone. Nevertheless, at the EU Summit on 
July 21, 2011, a plan for gradual cancellation of 
“provisional regulation measures” and the “aus-
terity program” were approved.
American Factor. Within this period a political 
factor came into play — the increase of confronta-
tion between the White House and the Congress 
(summer 2011). It inevitably speeded up the im-
petus for debt crisis unrolling in Europe. The 
grounds for the debt crisis have already been laid 
by political debates in the USA about the size of 
debt ceiling to be determined by the Resolution 
of the US Congress. Having shifted to Europe, 
this scandal transformed into the debt crisis of 
the Mediterranean countries of Eurozone, then — 
into the financial crisis and soon — into the “great 
recession” (as analysts called it). In my opinion, 
the day when President Obama (July 2011) ad-
dressed the Congress with a bill On Raising the 
National Debt Ceiling (the final word rests with 
the Congress) should be considered the day when 
this recession began. The Republicans who con-
trol the House of Representatives (the Lower 
House) literally started blackmailing the Cabinet 
of Barak Obama seeking to block the laws on com-
prehensive medical insurance and the tax increase 
for rich people (whose income exceeded USD 
1  million). Eventually, the (temporary) compro-
mise was found by the concessions of the White 
House, however the problem of public debt esca-
lated. Everywhere — in the USA, Europe, Russia, 
Latin America, Asia, Africa — they started to speak 
about weakening US Dollar, rising Euro, a possibil-
ity for the Yuan to become the world reserve cur-
rency. Against this background, the US Dollar quo-
tation was falling, the Euro was rising. All atten-
tion of the world media and economic analysts was 
paid to the situation in the USA, fight between the 
President and the Congress, giant debt ceiling and 
the US debt. At that very moment, the attention of 
the international public and media was switched 
to the European countries. Fitch Ratings and other 
American credit rating agencies downgraded the 
European banks in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy 
and France, and then — lowered the sovereign rat-
ings of the states. 
Attack upon Greece. Financial markets were 
the first to bring a knockout punch upon Greece, 
having brought it to the brink of bankruptcy. 
Desperate appeals of Greece government for pe-
cuniary aid (initially in the amount of 30 mil-
lion Euro) faced an unapproachable bureaucratic 
wall built diligently in the EU and Eurozone — 
endless sessions of different agencies lasted for 
many months. At that time, the artificial debt cri-
sis fuelled by global political maneuvers unfolded 
rapidly into a full-scale financial and economic 
crisis in Europe, where Greece was the first vic-
tim of these phenomenal events and political in-
trigues. By this time, neither 30 million nor hun-
dreds of millions Euro were able to save it from 
this crisis. Gradually, the whole group of southern 
countries of Eurozone — the Mediterranean coun-
tries, including Spain, Portugal and Italy (later 
Cyprus) got in the hardest financial situation that 
caused the fall of their governments and acces-
sion to power by other parties and their leaders. 
Could they change situations in their countries? 
Of course not since they were in a death grip of the 
destructive policy of the IMF, Brussels and Berlin. 
As a matter of fact, all countries of Eurozone, ex-
cept the Federal Republic of Germany, experi-
enced the strongest business slowdown — that 
was when “the Great European Recession” started. 
It moved fast to the USA (although it was the USA 
that caused it initially) and suspended the growth 
of the US economy, particularly, after the begin-
ning of the above debates in summer 2011. Such 
a huge shake of two leading economic centers of 
the world — the European Union and the USA — 
certainly had a powerful influence upon the en-
tire global economy, its growth slowed down dras-
tically encouraged by the decline in economic 
growth of China, India, Brazil and other fast-grow-
ing countries, which during the previous crisis 
played a role of an engine impeding deeper fall 
of the developed countries economies. This time 
they could not reasonably play this role. 
The Fundamental Causes of “the Great 
Recession” — a Man-Made Crisis
Let us summarize the factors that caused “the 
Great Recession” of 2011–2013.
Firstly, in my opinion, the political factor men-
tioned above played here a significant role — an 
explicit urge of the USA to switch the epicenter 
of attention from the UD Dollar depreciation and 
the interrelation between the supreme authorities 
(the President and Congress) to the other compet-
ing center — the European Union (in order to con-
siderably weaken it). And for that purpose, Greece 
was initially chosen as the weakest link in the EU 
and (Eurozone). This plan succeeded completely. 
The all-round talks regarding the “weak US 
Dollar” and a necessity to substitute it with “an-
other reserve currency” (Euro, Yen, Yuan, a collec-
tive currency, etc.) stopped: the Dollar started to 
grow strong and the Euro was falling. But this rea-
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son would not be able to work effectively if it were 
not for other fundamental reasons. 
Secondly, in my opinion, it was fundamen-
tally wrong policy both of the USA (the Ministry 
of Finance, the Federal Reserve System) and the 
IMF, the OECD, the ECB that in 2010 already pro-
ceeded to scaling down anti-crisis measures taken 
in 2008–2009. Under their pressure, the EU even 
drafted a schedule for cancellation of the speci-
fied “provisional regulation measures” (being far 
from “provisional” when they were introduced). 
The matter is that in 2010 the economy was over-
coming the hardest situation, the revival that grew 
into the rise was only starting, and although the 
performance indicators of that year were encour-
aging they were unstable. The IMF and Brussels 
believed the crisis was over and one could come 
back to customary contemplative idleness of pre-
vious decades. But in fact the responsible policy 
required saving all those measures that guaran-
teed the positive result in 2010. Quick cancella-
tion of the governmental measures that blocked 
the crisis stopped the growth, and the results of 
2011 and then 2012–2013 appeared to be different 
from those estimated for the post-crisis dynamics. 
Thirdly, the European Union completely lost an 
initiative in the development of own conceptual 
framework for the economic policy, and subordi-
nated it to the IMF instructions that, in its turn, 
traditionally adheres to practices inadequate to 
the global economy requirements, hence, inflict-
ing huge damage to national economies. This was 
not discovered yesterday or today, but at the time 
when the Washington Consensus was prepared 
that played a fatal role for the USA itself. 
This Consensus caused a long period of poor 
growth rates of the USA, the EU, Japan (and 
Russia), whilst China, India, Brazil, South Korea 
and other countries started to push them out of 
their dominating positions in the world economy. 
These countries (especially China, India, Brazil 
and South Korea) that denied this Consensus 
were progressing successfully, consistently and 
dynamically.
Fourthly, in 2011–2013, an incomplete “loose” 
nature of the European united institutions be-
came apparent, even more than during the cri-
sis of 2008–2009. The author mentioned this in-
completeness of the EU institutions in his books 
during the whole previous decade, long before the 
crisis began (2008). Is it rightfully to rise such a 
question now, taking into account a negative ex-
perience of Brussels’ macroeconomic policy in 
2010–2013? Since the weakened countries have to 
accept the wrong decisions of Brussels (like it was 
with the Mediterranean countries — the members 
of Eurozone during last years), the strengthening 
of the Brussels positions, more probably, can bring 
harm to them.
Fifthly, such a unique phenomenon as a new 
centre of the real power was formed, without the 
consent of which no important financial decision 
of the EU can be taken: the triangle: Berlin — IMF 
— Brussels with evident domination of the IMF.
Sixthly, a pernicious role of the budget econ-
omy and cuts in public expenditures implemented 
in the late 2010 and 2011 became apparent. It ar-
tificially caused the great recession and depleted 
the growth potential of the European countries. 
Rigid cuts in the public expenditures for social 
purposes, including for education and health care, 
freezing of salaries, retirement benefits, and wel-
fare payments — all these and many other fac-
tors reduced the demand, increased unemploy-
ment, decreased investments — these are the key 




The theoretical foundation for this policy of 
the IMF-Berlin-Brussels was the econometric re-
searches of Rogoff-Reinhardt who derived a mis-
taken formula of correlation between the amount 
of country’s debt and the economic growth. These 
famous Harvard professors offered a “salvatory 
idea (formula)” for a “new austerity policy” in the 
EU. It proved fatal for the European economic 
policy encouraging the politization of the pub-
lic debt problem and turning it into the horrify-
ing factor, like a giant shadow of Hamlet’s father. 
Rogoff-Reinhardt’s formula allegedly proved a di-
rect correlation between the amount of the public 
debt (within 90 % from the GDP) and the country’s 
economic growth rates. The EU officials used it, as 
Krugman specified, to justify the “austerity policy” 
(or “belt-tightening” policy etc) — “the most ab-
surd policy for the country suffering from finan-
cial crisis and recession” 1. I always believed that 
this policy might be justified in the conditions of 
the economy revival only, but not during the re-
cession, when additional incentives are required 
for business recovery. 
Firstly, there is no such a limit of 90 %, even 
despite that during the last years, European pol-
iticians were constantly saying that the economy 
would go into stagnation if the debt exceeds 90 % 
of the GDP. “The establishment of this limit in the 
original article was a result of data lack (it was un-
intentional, and, perhaps, inevitable when using 
1 Greece is meant.
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strange statistical tools”, Paul Krugman wrote in 
his article (the word “strange”, probably, is an el-
egant euphemism for another term — “fraud”) [5]. 
He acted generously to his ideological opponents 
by protecting their names from the accusations in 
manipulation which does credit to him as a proper 
scientist. Frankly speaking, the representatives of 
the neoliberal monetarism are characterized with 
the opposite behaviour — aggressiveness, biting 
critics of opponents and bald rudeness. Secondly, 
there is a moderate inflation between the debt 
and the economic growth. Nothing more, even 
if we interpret it as causation, this correlation is 
too weak to explain the debt panic of last years. 
As Brad Delong wrote in his blog: “As far as I may 
judge, the matter is that the increase of the debt 
from 50 GDP to 150 GDP can lead to the decrease 
of the growth rates by 0.1 per year within the next 
5 years”. Even if it is so, it is not dangerous, and, 
accordingly, there is no direct correlation, thus, 
the derivation of the basic constructions in pol-
itics based thereon is a height of irresponsibil-
ity. Thirdly, there are quite convincing evidences 
that low growth rates, as a rule, lead to the debt 
increase, but not the opposite, as the formula of 
Rogoff-Reinhardt says. “We allowed for unjustified 
fear to dominate the economic discourse for three 
years”, a famous economist says. In the EU, par-
ticularly in Eurozone, the situation remains un-
stable, since a group of countries is experiencing 
an acute budget crisis, hardly managing to ser-
vice the public debt that grew beyond measures in 
the world crisis of 2008–2010 and the recession of 
2011–2013. Business recovery that started in au-
tumn 2013 as a result of positive changes in the US 
economy and a new upturn activity in China and 
India are weak and unstable now. Nevertheless, 




The underlying causes for the crisis of the 
Eurozone are serious intraregional differences in 
the levels of competitive abilities and growing re-
gional disbalances related thereto (including in-
ter-country trade in the EU that is considered as 
regional trade). The members of the Monetary 
Union were obliged to keep a common low infla-
tion rate at the level of “lower but around 2 %” 
and so made themselves trapped, having given the 
priority to the control over the inflation and cuts 
in public expenditures by balancing the budget 
at any cost rather than to economic growth and 
struggle with unemployment. It turned into a 
growth of trade non-balance in the EU, since the 
countries with low inflations were more compet-
itive than the countries with rapidly widening in-
flationary spiral of “salaries-prices”. As a matter 
of fact, the FRG with its powerful advanced tech-
nological production, which is extremely diversi-
fied, always wins from the regional trade. In the 
EU, as analysts stated, these imbalances in trade 
can remain for a long time, if the surplus coun-
tries finance the deficit countries through the fi-
nancial transfers. In the Monetary Union of the 
European countries, the growing trade imbalance 
influenced the finance sector in a form of private 
debt flows since the banks in the surplus coun-
tries, not having an opportunity to expand the op-
erations on the domestic markets, lent money to 
the deficit countries [6]. The inflow of the private 
loans, on which non-balanced European growth 
started to depend, stopped when the creditors be-
came uncertain about financial solvency of the 
debtors. The global crisis was merely an impulse 
that turned the booms and bubbles in the hous-
ing sector caused by internal reasons, into the de-
cline that covered the whole Europe. Then the 
ceased fever at the private loan market resulted 
into a series of debt crises, since the initial debt 
burdens of households turned into the bank cri-
ses, which, ultimately, transformed into the sover-
eign debt crises. Trying to treat the symptoms of 
the sovereign debt crisis with bigger budget sav-
ings, the European authorities raised the stakes in 
the game under the conditions when the draco-
nian measures of the budget savings drift debtor 
countries into the debt deflation. The defects of 
initial model of the Monetary Union are partially 
guilty for that. The authors of the Monetary Union 
did not provide for the demand regulation and de-
nied a necessity of the regulatory tools in the state 
macroeconomic policy. There was no coordination 
of the common European policy for these issues. 
Limiting the fiscal transfers, yet having no oppor-
tunity to prevent the growth of the “imbalance ar-
eas” that determined the necessity for these trans-
fers, the Monetary Union found itself in a dead-
end and in the “trap of obviousness” — that’s how 
the analysts revealed the internal springs of the 
crisis [7]. At present, having shifted the unpropor-
tionally high share of the re-balance burden to the 
countries with public budget deficit, the authori-
ties of Brussels — Berlin increase the expenditures 
of this course. 
Certain measures have recently been taken that 
provide for the establishment of a “firewall” in a 
form of the European Financial Stability Facility 
and the European Stabilization Mechanism as 
principal regulatory tools. However, they, as 
demonstrated by the experience of 2012–2013, 
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proved ineffective, since they were based on in-
itially wrong theory. In fact, all new initiatives 
are still developed based on a traditional slightly 
changed model of the Washington Consensus. 
The UN experts confirm this idea: “The measures 
are aimed mainly at strengthening the so called 
Stability and Growth Pact and bringing the policy 
in compliance with the latest version of the long-
term structural reform program in the EU — the 
Europe-2020 Strategy. Europe continues ignoring 
the critical matters of the domestic demand reg-
ulation and appropriate policy coordination to 
assure internal balance” [8]. Let us mention, this 
conclusion of the experts from one of the most 
reputed UN-related international organizations 
was made in the 2012 Report of United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. In prac-
tice, in 2012 and throughout 2013, the economy 
of most Eurozone countries underwent a severe 
financial crisis, although enormous financial re-
sources were attracted to overcome it. The mat-
ter is that the basis and the principles of the mar-
ket fundamentalism that is still being worshipped 
like a god by the leading politicians of the IMF — 
Brussels — Berlin result in a very little positive 
effect with giant expenditures. In these centers 
of power, as I think, there is no real great lead-
ership, hence, there is no political courage to 
change the vicious paradigm of the economic pol-
icy, which became evident as a result of two cri-
ses: 2008–2010 and 2011–2013. The IMF report 
for July (2014) predicts the bottom-level growth 
rates for the leading countries in 2014: the USA — 
at the level of 1.5 %, the EU — around 1.0 %, China 
— 7.7 % growth, Japan — 2.1 % growth, Russia — 
0.2 % growth (in 2015 — around 1 %) [9, p. 5] As 
we can see, hard times are waiting for the leading 
countries, including the European ones, and the 
“bright spot” in Q4 2013 that widened a little in 
2014, may well be covered again by a thick veil of 
stagnation. That will be more evident if Brussels 
and Berlin continue sticking to a blemish policy 
of reducing public expenditures and the “austerity 
policy” as dictated by the IMF, not speaking about 
destructing policy of sanctions against Russia that 
restrict the foreign trade relations of the European 
companies and banks. 
Destructive Role of the International 
Organizations 
There are no doubts in the necessity and a huge 
positive role of international financial and eco-
nomic organizations, but their activity can hardly 
be called positive in Europe in 2010–2013, rather 
counterproductive. Practically out of nothing, 
they provoked a new strongest financial and eco-
nomic crisis while the previous global crisis was 
not over yet (2008–2010). After reading the key 
provisions of February (2010) Report of the IMF, I 
saw the threat of a disruption of the global recov-
ery process. Its authors (mostly neoliberal mone-
tarists) suggested that the governments, taking 
into account their dynamic economic growth, 
should begin cancellation of “provisional regula-
tion measures.” During 2010, a number of reports 
of the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the Basel 
Bank for International Settlements were pub-
lished. They provided numerous reasons (sched-
ules, calculations, tables) that substantiate this 
necessity. At the same time, the Report of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development warned that the cancellation of 
“provisional regulation measures” is strictly un-
desirable, at least, in the nearest future, because 
the world economy growth was still unstable and 
there was a threat of its slowdown, if multidirec-
tional political actions were performed. 
Nevertheless, the Europeans decided to follow this 
way and to eliminate incentive actions and the 
governmental control over the financial institu-
tions for the purposes of “new return of market 
freedoms”. Paul Krugman wrote later about the 
impact of these organizations upon the European 
economy: “One of the distinguishing features of 
economic discourse after 2008 was a dramatically 
destructive role, which most of (although not all) 
international technocrats played. Facing the high 
unemployment and low inflation, the key institu-
tions — the European Commission, the Bank for 
International Settlements, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the IMF 
— persistently appealed to pursue the policy of 
budget savings that just intensified the depression 
in the developed countries” [10]. It is interesting 
that these recommendations did not appear as a 
result of strict adherence to traditional economic 
models of liberal monetarism, as it could be ex-
pected. The traditional models state that fiscal 
policy of compression leads to compression and 
should not be applied when its effect can be neu-
tralized by more liberal monetary policy. And, sure 
enough, these approaches and models, even tak-
ing into account their doubtful nature, do not sup-
pose the increase of interest rates in the condi-
tions of high unemployment and low inflation. 
However, specialists — managers (technocrats) in 
these institutions decided that this process could 
continue endlessly. They assumed that simultane-
ous toughening of fiscal and monetary policies is 
right. Moreover, they were thinking up different 
stories on-the-go (it is hard to call them models) 
to justify their requirements. Krugman writes: “I 
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think we should call these people just “crats” be-
cause “techno” was thrown away into the bin and 
substituted for intuition or something more 
doubtful. Anyway, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development is the arch villain, 
or well, one of them (the Bank for International 
Settlements can compete with it with regard to 
expensive money, the same as the IMF), in terms 
of the “austerity policy” implementation. And cer-
tainly, the Eurozone business is bad: the recession 
became protracted and the growth appeared to be 
weak. What are the reasons? Of course, it is the 
uncertainty of business communities, as the chief 
economist of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development states. And this 
uncertainty was caused by the mentioned interna-
tional regulators, their destructive “policy of com-
pression” and “austerity policy” at the most un-
suitable time. In the article devoted to the analysis 
of the situation in the EU, Antonio Feitas, an econ-
omist, is surprised that the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development in 
Europe seems to be unable even to admit that bad 
economic performance of Europe may result from 
the budget savings policy. After all — the OECD 
was among the first and largest advocates of the 
belt-tightening policy. It is clear why they do not 
want to admit that, actually, they were the ones 
that pushed Europe to a disaster. This is an ex-
plicit fear of responsibility and forced resignation 
from cushy jobs. Krugman stresses: “What we 
have just seen in Eurozone is the closest to reality 
experiment on budget policy we have ever seen, 
and its results mostly point at the rightness of the 
Keynesian views. The followers of the “austerity 
policy” used the prospect of another Greece for in-
timidating politicians and the community, in or-
der to introduce the policy that only worsens the 
economy decline. A wrong approach to Greece 
practiced by many of those who feed these fears 
made the prospect of another Greece even more 
scaring. At least the IMF learnt something from its 
experience. But, as Wren-Lewis wrote, the 
European Central Bank does not seem to change 
its point of view or to show any remorse, but it is a 
really important player at this stage” [5, p. 5]. At 
the same time, the EU administration (eurobu-
reaucracy) costs a lot for the countries (their pop-
ulation) — the staff is 46 thousand people, the 
budget exceeds 18 thousand Euro annually, mini-
mum salary is 18 thousand Euro, plus lots of ben-
efits covering their families. The economist wrote: 
“The facts show that the advocates of the auster-
ity policy in Europe made a fatal mistake, having 
destroyed the well-being of millions of people. 
However, the guilty persons will never admit that, 
they will do anything to be off the hook. As a mat-
ter of fact, the advocates of the austerity policy 
pushed Europe to catastrophe. This is what hap-
pened in 2011–2013 when entire Europe was 
squeezed by the great recession; it became signif-
icantly weaker politically as well and that in-
creased the opportunity of the USA to press upon 
it. With this regard, the New York Times makes a 
conclusion: “Instead of learning from the mis-
takes of the past, the European officials seem to be 
ready to repeat them in Spain, Italy and other 
countries” 1. The most surprising is that these ob-
vious mistakes of the most influential interna-
tional organizations are not taken into considera-
tion in the economic policy of the European 
Commission and the European governments. 
However, the UN and its organizations (the 
Economic and Social Council, the United National 
Conference on Trade, etc.) had the other — oppo-
site — attitude to the decisions related to the 
countermeasures to a new cycle of the European 
and global financial crisis. In June (2012) Report of 
the UN Economic and Social Council, in Chapter 3 
called Some of the Keynesianism, the following 
was stressed: “After many years of appeals to 
weaken the role of the state in economy manage-
ment, many governments both in the developed 
and emerging countries introduced extensive sta-
bilization measures to recover the aggregate de-
mand and took measures to save the financial sec-
tor. Before the crisis, the stimulative fiscal policy 
was often considered ineffective because any in-
crease of deficit in the public sector must be com-
pensated by the same decrease of private ex-
penses. But since the impact of the monetary pol-
icy during the crisis was limited, the traditional 
concern about the budget balance or short-term 
fiscal targets merged into the background, and the 
governments were again considered as “ultimate 
buyers and borrowers”. These were classic meth-
ods of the Keynesian regulation, which brought a 
positive effect and facilitated the economy recov-
ery from the severe crisis” [8, p. 4]. What happened 
later? The Report of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development has the answer: 
“However, the recent trends of the fiscal and mon-
etary policy in many countries, and the recom-
mendations of leading international institutions, 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, demonstrate that there was no 
deeper re-thinking of the macroeconomic policy 
after the admission of a necessity of fiscal incen-
tives during the crisis. In 2011, many governments 
1  The New York Times. — 2013. — June 7.
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changed radically their policy again, shifting from 
the fiscal incentives to tougher fiscal policy, and 
the others are planning to do that. This causes a 
special concern since in most of the developed 
countries that suffered seriously from the finan-
cial crisis the private sector has not finished the 
adjustment of the debt and assets ratio, within 
which non-financial subjects strive for decreasing 
their debt and the banks try to recover their capi-
tal ratios. During this debt deflation, even if the 
monetary policy continues weakening and low in-
terest rates remain, such tougher fiscal policy will 
hardly have a serious incentive influence upon the 
expected growth” [8, p. 4]. Further, the authors of 
the UN Report stress that in this situation, a re-
stricting monetary policy aiming at the budget 
consolidation or the decrease of public debt is un-
likely to succeed since the national economy func-
tions in a way different from a particular company 
or a household functioning (as some experts of the 
IMF and other organizations that influencing the 
European and the global policy, think). The UN ex-
perts warned foresightedly that the harsh auster-
ity measures, due to their negative influence upon 
the aggregate demand and taxation base, would 
lead to the reduction in the budget receipts and 
would disrupt the budget consolidation, would 
lead to the deterioration of the situation in the 
European countries and many other countries that 
may follow the same reformation policy. In chap-
ter Financial Deregulation Opened the Door to 
Excessive Risk Taking, the UN experts highlighted 
that the increased deficits of public sectors and 
public debts were a consequence of a hard crisis in 
the financial system caused by a wave of liberali-
zation of this system, where so called Anglo-Saxon 
countries played the leading role. Thus, there is a 
particular paradox: those participants of financial 
markets that ignited the crisis are to judge the op-
timality of the public policy aiming at the crisis 
mitigation. The liberalization and deregulation of 
the financial system were based on widely spread 
belief into better efficiency of the market forces, 
and they led to the formation of increasingly so-
phisticated financial instruments. New financial 
instruments and continued liberalization of the fi-
nancial system opened an opportunity for signifi-
cant expansion of the speculative activity, as a re-
sult of which stock exchange gambling turned into 
an important, sometimes even dominating, ele-
ment of the financial activity. That became the 
strongest source of instability in many countries 
and in the entire global economic system. The 
strong belief that the markets are the best judges 
of efficient distribution of the production factors 
gave an impulse to the policy developers to con-
tinue this deregulation. Only after the global fi-
nancial crisis unfolded, serious debates about a 
necessity of fundamental reforms to prevent the 
analogous crisis in the future finally started. A 
wide acknowledgement that the deregulation was 
one of the main factors that led to the global fi-
nancial and economic crisis raised the appeals to 
strengthen financial regulation and control. Fatal 
defect of the financial markets is explained by the 
fact that the activity associated with the “gregari-
ous behaviour” (i.e. following a tendency for a 
while and withdrawal of funds just before the 
crowd makes that) brings the highest profit. 
Besides, making the tasks of the budget balance or 
low public debt an end in itself can have a destruc-
tive impact upon the achievement of other eco-
nomic goals, e.g. high employment rates and so-
cially acceptable distribution of income. The in-
crease of infrastructure expenditures, social trans-
fers or grant-in-aids for private investors, as a 
rule, can be more efficient for the economy stimu-
lation than tax cuts, since that leads to the in-
crease of purchases and demand immediately [8, 
p. 7]. This policy is more favorable for big coun-
tries with strong economy but disastrous for weak 
and poorly balanced national economic systems, 
critically associated with big economic blocs and 
international economy. With this regard, one can 
definitely say that the triangle of Brussels — Berlin 
— IMF with obvious supremacy of the latter, that 
forced Europe to accept the “austerity policy”, cuts 
in public expenditures, leads to further weakening 
of the weak countries and the rise of Germany, its 
economy. This policy is nothing but a grave digger 
for the economic growth of the countries that are 
weaker than a powerful, extremely diversified, 
highly technological economy of the FRG that is 
connected to the global market economy. Putting 
aside any economic theories and using only the 
simplest common-sense logic, it is impossible to 
understand the essence of the EU policy. How can 
the savings of financial resources revitalize the 
struggling economy in the conditions of severe 
crisis? Shouldn’t more money be allocated to en-
large employment, to support entrepreneurship, 
to help the population in need, etc.? It is not a dis-
covery that the “policy of austerity” should be in-
troduced in the periods of dynamic growth, but 
not during the crisis time — that is the ABC of both 
classical and Keynesian schools. But it completely 
meets the latest interpretations of the 
Friedmanism that had such a poisonous influence 
upon the global economy. It meets the interests of 
financial and governing political strata, and what 
is not less important — the interests of national 
and international bureaucracy. 
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This artificial theoretical framework form-
ing the basis of economic policy holds in its iron 
grip the governments and international bureau-
cracy, which is possible, first of all, since this bu-
reaucracy is interested in this policy. The decla-
ration of the global market as a sort of all-mighty 
Leviathan, a universal regulator of the economic 
processes, released the governments of the coun-
tries and international bureaucracy from respon-
sibility for the state of economy — “so it goes, that 
is a market”. And the declaration of the private 
property only as a sort of a sacred cow at the heart 
of this market, turns the politics into dogmatism, 
promotes the irresponsibility of politicians, cre-
ates illusions based on realities of previous ages. 
Russia-Ukraine Crisis, Western Sanctions and 
New “Old” Pressing Tasks
I, like many authors of the journal, during 
the previous years often wrote about a neces-
sity to balance the national economy, to restore 
the destroyed machine-building (and machine 
tool building), to recreate the former Ministry 
of Electronic Industry, to rebuild completely de-
stroyed civil aircraft industry and so on. All that 
became more than topical in light of the cri-
sis of our relations with Ukraine and unfolding 
Western sanctions, which probably would unfold 
even more. By the way, the break-off with Ukraine 
means more than Western sanctions, taking into 
account that the Ukrainian military-space complex 
supplied the crucial equipment for Russian heavy 
strategic missiles (adjustment and maintenance); 
other enterprises of the Ukrainian military-space 
complex supplied the engines for military heli-
copters, deck machinery etc. It is also strange that 
at the background of numerous statements about 
a “complete destruction of the Ukrainian econ-
omy”, it managed to save the manufacture of the 
whole class of famous Antonov (AN) planes and 
even successfully manufactures Mriya, the biggest 
plane in the world, with weight-lifting capacity of 
250 tons. These Ukrainian enterprises had been 
successfully cooperating with the Russian ones 
until the last months. The question is: why did the 
Russian “captains of the military-space complex” 
not transfer these manufactures to Russia, for ex-
ample, through some subsidiaries or branches? 
And why did this simple idea not come to the gov-
ernment top leaders? Moreover, there was plenty 
of money in the treasury. I am not sure that they 
will be able to cope with the current, quickly com-
plicating situation, if they were not able to cope 
with these tasks almost in the ideal conditions. 
To manufacture a “super-jet” somewhere near.... 
Genoa (!) having collected every little bit, some 
minor details from the world and having spent a 
lot of public money on this junk — probably, it was 
considered more “efficient” — but for whom? And 
that is the result — the ball started rolling — the 
Russian company Dobrolyot lost an opportunity to 
fly their aircrafts in the Russian sky only because 
it had flown to Simferopol. Is it not a shame for the 
country? The explanation is the only one — it flies 
the aircrafts manufactured abroad. If the sanc-
tions become more extensive — all aircrafts will 
“lay up”: they are mostly Boeings or other ones, 
but manufactured abroad. And what about the 
powerful construction, mining and agricultural 
machinery? Almost everything is made abroad, 
the same as consumer goods industry (clothing, 
footwear, household appliances etc). Of course, for 
China, South Korea, Turkey, Taiwan, etc. (if some 
of them do not join the regime of sanctions) the 
opportunities at the Russian market are becom-
ing wider, but they will hardly cover losses from 
the West. Therefore, the governing class (politi-
cal elite and business) is facing challenges on real 
diversification of the national economy. For that, 
the full rethinking of the economic policy is re-
quired, particularly, the government must cast off 
the false interpretations a la market fundamental-
ism, with which it is significantly contaminated. 
Russia has been in need of another theoretic and 
methodological basis for serious economic policy 
that will serve the interests not only of the rich 
class, but also of the whole society for a long time. 
Many people can say “right” speeches but few can 
implement them into particular business. I would 
like the words to materialize into real achieve-
ments while it is not late.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST CRISES:  
POLITICAL ECONOMY TRADITIONS AND MODERNITY1 
The article discusses the development history of the theory of economic crises under capitalism condi-
tions. The author believes that economic science is being developed in two directions. The first direction is 
represented by science schools that deny any objective grounds for crises of overproduction in the market 
economy and develop new models of crisis-free growth. The opposite direction is supported by science schools 
acknowledging the existence of objective causes of crises, which is of practical significance for development of 
effective anti-crisis measures. The study is summarized by the conclusion about actualization of the politi-
cal economy approach to analysis of the recent global crisis and its consequences. Its implementation antici-
pates special attention to different versions of overaccumulation of capital which played a key role in the or-
igin of crisis processes in the world economy. 
Keywords: economic crisis, causes of crisis, economic schools and crises, accumulation of capital, current crisis 
and political economy
Economic science addressed to the special 
study of cycles and crises of overproduction in the 
period when its foundations had been formed. The 
first such crisis took place in England in 1825. It 
should be noted that thereafter, numerous repre-
sentatives of different science schools denied any 
objective grounds for crises of overproduction and 
linked the probability of their occurrence to fail-
ures, wars, political events, and natural disasters. 
This approach was based on the key assumption 
that the market mechanism was able to equilibrate 
demand and supply automatically. Initially, the 
idea of automaticity in the supply-demand equi-
librium was substantiated by J. B. Say (1767–1832) 
1 The article is reprinted with the permission of “The Journal of 
Economic Theory, 2014, №4” and Ryazanov V.
© Ryazanov V. Text. 2015.
and received the title of Say’s law. According to 
him, supply constitutes its own demand, because 
income is equal to the cost of output in the pro-
duction process. If a part of income is transformed 
into savings, but not used directly to purchase 
goods, it automatically turns to be investments 
and, thus, goes back to the production process en-
suring the equilibrium of savings and investment. 
This, in principle, eliminates the problem of sales, 
and hence the possibility of crises of overproduc-
tion. If it still occurs, then the cause is in the effect 
of external and accidental factors. 
One could consider Sismondi (1773–1842) to be 
the first economist-theorist who tried to discover 
the objective preconditions for crises of overpro-
duction. In 1819, even before the first crisis of over-
production, he proposed “the theory of undercon-
sumption” as a reason and argued against the au-
